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Abstract 
Migrants’ remittances have become an important development 
tool because they can raise income and reduce poverty rates in 
developing countries.  These remittances might also promote 
development by providing funds that recipients can spend on education 
or health care or invest in entrepreneurial activities. Thus, workers’ 
remittances are a steadily growing external source of capital for 
developing countries.  In spite of the fact that importance of remittances 
in total international capital flows are increasing, the relationship 
between remittances and growth has not been adequately studied. The 
main aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of remittances on 
economic growth for the transition countries. For the aim of the study, 
we test the hypothesis suggested by the Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2005), which states that remittances can substitute for a lack of financial 
development and hence promote economic growth. We use panel data for 
the transition countries between the time period 2001-2012. The results 
of the study suggest that there is a negative significant effect of 
remittances on economic growth in the transition economies. 
Keywords: economic growth, transition countries, remittances, panel 
data 
JEL Codes: C51, F22, F24, O16. 
Introduction 
International migration has gained importance for the transition 
process in the former centrally planned economies of the Eastern 
European Countries and the former Soviet Union Countries and has 
received a high attention through international forums in recent years. 
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Remittance flows to the developing countries of Europe and Central 
Asian region have increased by a substantial amount in recent years4. 
Also, these flows have been the important aspect of the reintegration of 
these economies into the international economic system. In the view of 
the aging population in Europe and some countries of the former Soviet 
Union and differences in economic growth performance, it is likely that 
migration will continue to play an important role in at least at the 
medium-term perspective. Migration flows to these economies have 
different pattern. Most of the labour migration from Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe has been directed to the Western European and North 
American countries, while the destination for the main part of the 
migration of members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is 
to Russia and Kazakhstan. In the European and the Central Asian 
regions, Russia is the largest source of remittances, which is accounted 
31 per cent of total remittances in the region (see World Bank, 2013).  
Labour migration has different implications for economic growth 
for the destination country and country of origin. For the country of 
origin, it reduces the social tension and gives the possibility to reduce 
poverty by increasing the consumption of households. Thus, remittances 
sent by migrants to their left-behind families give some reliefs on 
liquidity constraints faced in the home country. On the other hand, some 
factors, such as brain-drain, may have negative impact on the long term 
economic growth performance of the sending economy. Therefore, it is 
critically important for migrant sending economies to effectively use the 
received remittances for investment purposes. 
Several studies have investigated the economic consequences of 
remittances on economic growth in recipient countries, but the results are 
largely inconclusive (see for example, Chami et.al., 2005; Adam and 
Page, 2005; Le 2009; Annen et al., 2016; Batu, 2017; Meyer and Shera, 
2017; Clemens and McKenzie 2018;  Kumar et.al, 2018;  Mondal and 
Rasheda, 2018). Although it is undeniable that remittances have poverty-
alleviating and consumption-smoothing effects, important empirical 
question is whether remittances serve to promote economic growth for 
recipient countries or not.  Some researchers argue that remittances may 
have negative impact on growth by reducing labour supply or labour 
force participation rate (see Chami et.al 2005; Barajas et al 2009; Lartey 
et al. 2008). For example, Chami et al.(2005) and Le (2009) show that 
remittances do have a deleterious effect on recipient economies. Also 
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Barajas et al. (2009) found that workers’ remittances have no impact on 
economic growth. Moreover, remittances could adversely influence long-
run economic growth through the Dutch disease effect (see, for example, 
Lartey et al. 2008).  Clemens and McKenzie (2018) argue that increasing 
remittances associated with growing migration tendency may have 
negative effect on economic growth of the country of origin. Senbeta 
(2013) found that remittances have considerable positive impact on 
capital accumulation, while this effect on total factor productivity (TFP) 
appeared to be as insignificant. It is concluded that remittances may 
increase investment, but low efficiency may create ground for total 
negative effect of remittances over economic growth.  
On the other hand, some other authors argue that remittances can 
increase economic growth through an increase in investment (Giuliano 
and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Nyamongo et al., 2012, Batu, 2017). Several 
studies indicate conditionality of the impact of remittances on other 
fundamentals of economic growth. For example, Bjuggren, Dzansi and 
Shukur (2010) indicated that positive effect of remittances may decrease 
with development of institutions and credit market in a country. 
However, Catrinescu et al. (2009) indicated that under good institutions 
remittances could bring about higher economic growth. Feeny et al. 
(2014) examined the  impact of remittances on economic growth in small 
island developing countries (Pacific and sub-Saharan African group of 
samples) and showed that remittances have positive impact on economic 
growth and  low economic volatility and increasing labour supply. Also, 
Batu (2017) found out that temporary inflows of worker remittances 
positively affect GDP per capita while a permanent increase of 
remittances does not affect output growth.  
To our best knowledge, there has been a limited amount of 
research on the macroeconomic impact of remittances on economic 
performance of transition economies. For example, Iradian (2007) carried 
out a research to investigate the factors that explain fast economic growth 
in CIS countries including remittances as possible explanatory variable as 
well. He found out that the estimated coefficients for changes in terms-
of-trade and remittances to GDP ratio are positive and significant. These 
two factors are estimated to have accounted for about 1.5 percentage 
points of the region’s annual average growth all together. Atamanov et al. 
(2009) aimed to identify the impact of migration and remittances on 
income and income distribution in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and 
Kyrgyzstan. This study concluded that remittances considerably affect 
household consumption and income distribution in these economies. 
Castaldo and Reilly (2007) study on Albania show that remittances do 
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not considerably change the consumption pattern of households. 
Descriptive analysis of migration and remittances by Kaczmarczyk and 
Okolski (2008) on Poland and Baltic states showed the limited impact of 
remittances on macroeconomic indicators. Blouchoutzi and Nikas (2010) 
studied the macroeconomic impact of remittances in Romania, Bulgaria 
and Albania. They found that along with other factors, remittances 
positively contribute to private consumption, import and investment 
expenditures. Also, Kumar et al. (2018) examined the impact of 
remittances versus financial development on the economic growth of 
Kyrgyzstan and Macedonia. The results of the study show that the impact 
of financial development is negative and significant only for Kyrgyzstan, 
and not statistically significant for Macedonia.  
Thus, we might say that impact of remittances on economic 
growth is inconclusive. Full understanding of the impact of remittances 
on macroeconomic performance needs more detailed analysis through 
inclusion of other conditional factors. One can say that migrant 
remittances are particularly important in the transition economies and 
larger investigations are needed to examine the real impact of these 
remittances on economic growth. Therefore, the the main aim of this 
study is to investigate the impact of remittances on economic growth in 
the transition countries by using the panel data for the time period 2001-
20125. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents 
the importance of remittances in the transition economies; Section 3 
presents the data and section 4 is about methodology employed in the 
study; Section 5  illustrates the results of the empirical study and Section 
6 gives the conclusion and policy recommendations. 
The Importance of Remittances in the Transition Economies 
According to the World Bank data, the value of remittances in 
terms of US dollar vary between transition countries. For instance, in 
2015 Russia and Poland received more than $ 6 billion as personal 
remittances, while in some countries such as Moldova and Armenia it 
accounted for about only $1.5 billion. However, the size of these 
economies is different and absolute value of remittances may give biased 
picture of its importance for these countries. Data regarding the receipt of 
remittances of the transition countries as a per cent of GDP are given in 
Figure 1. As the figure shows, remittances have increased considerably in 
most of the economies for the last ten years. Although, one can note that 
 
5 We used the latest data available when the study was carried out.  
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there is a decreasing tendency of remittances in 2016 compared to 2008 
and 2012. Main reason for this trend is the weak economic growth in 
remittance-source countries, which is mostly associated with low oil 
prices, especially in Russia (Ratha et al., 2016). In the transition 
countries, remittances fell by 22.5 in 2015, while in 2014 it decreased by 
6.2 per cent. 
Among these countries, in 2016 share of remittances in GDP is 
much larger for Tajikistan (26 percent), Kyrgyzstan (29 percent), 
Moldova (18 percent), Armenia (13.11 per cent), Albania (11 per cent), 
Georgia (10 per cent) and Ukraine (10 per cent).  Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan are also among the top ten remittance recipient countries in 
the world. In the other countries, excluding Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Slovenia, remittances receipt varies from 1 to 4 per cent of GDP.  
Figure 1: The Share of Remittances in GDP in the Transition Economies 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Tajikistan is the most dependent country on remittances among 
the countries in the world. It is estimated that more than 10 per cent of 
the population are abroad for employment purposes, mostly in Russia 
(see UNICEF, 2011, p.3). Kyrgyzstan’s economic dependence on 
remittances is also substantial. Economic growth driven by revenues 
from oil exports and a declining domestic labour force has attracted 
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millions of labour migrants. Russia’s Federal Migration Service estimates 
that out of 11.3 million foreigners entering Russia in 2013, and three 
million of them work illegally (World Bank, 2013). 
Although importance of remittances in terms of the size varies 
over transition economies, remittances represent the large inflow of 
transfers that may be used for current consumption or for investment 
purposes for most of the low income transition countries. Being used for 
current consumption, they may contribute to poverty reduction and 
mitigates social tension.  
 
Data 
In this study, the data for 22 transition countries for the period 
2001-2012 are employed. The countries are listed in Table 1.  
Table 1:  List of Countries 
ALB-Albania 
BGR- Bulgaria 
HRV-Croatia 
CZE-Czech republic 
HUN-Hungary 
EST- Estonia 
LVA – Latvia 
LTU-Lithuania 
POL-Poland 
ROM- Romania 
SVK- Slovak Republic 
SVN- Slovenia 
RUS –Russia  
ARM- Armenia 
AZE- Azerbaijan 
BLR - Belarus 
GEO - Georgia 
MDA - Macedonia 
UKR - Ukraine 
KAZ - Kazakhstan 
KGZ - Kyrgyzstan 
TJK - Tajikistan 
 
 
We used balanced panel data in this study. Data sources are 
mainly from the World Development Indicators database of the World 
Bank, IMF World Economic Outlook, European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD)6, and statistics of the CIS and national Central 
Bank data of relevant countries7.  In this study, the GDP per capita 
 
6 Economic data by EBRD available on: http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/ 
data.shtml 
7 Available on: www.cisstat.com 
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growth rate is the dependent variable, while the share of remittances to 
GDP is used as the main independent variable in the study. Also, 
financial development is measured with domestic credit to private sector 
as the percentage of the GDP. Table 2 shows the variables we used in the 
study and the sources of these variables. 
Table 2: Variables and Data Sources 
 Description Source 
yit GDP per capita (constant 
2005 US$) 
World Bank WDI 
. 
 
REM/GDP Worker’s remittances, 
personal transfers and 
compensation of 
employees received (% 
of GDP ) 
 
World Bank WDI 
 
DC/GDP Domestic credit to 
private sector  provided 
by financial corporations 
(% of GDP) 
 
World Bank WDI 
 
INV/GDP Total Investment(% of 
GDP) 
IMF WEO 
 
 
GOVBALN/GDP General government 
balance (% of GDP) 
 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development, IMF 
WEO 
GOVERNANCE Average of six 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). 
Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI); for 2001 
average value of 1998 
and 2000 is used 
TRADE Net barter terms of trade 
index (2000 = 100) 
 
World Bank WDI 
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POPULATION Population growth 
(annual %) 
 
World Bank WDI 
REFORM Average of six indicators 
of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development. (EBRD 
Reform Index) 
EBRD 
 
We use the set of explanatory variables consists of other variables 
as control variables. These variables are investment in per cent of GDP, 
economic stability measures such as general government balance, foreign 
trade conditions measured through the terms of trade and population 
growth rate. In addition to these variables, following the literature on 
economic growth performance of the transition economies, average of 
the six Governance Indicators and EBRD reform index are used as well. 
Former indicator measures institutional development, while the latter 
indicates the progress of the country in economic reforms.  
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of GDP per capita growth, 
remittances to GDP and other control variables for the countries covered 
in the study.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean SD Min Max 
 0.047 0.054 -0.158 0.285 
lnyit-1 8.307 1.075 5.621 9.952 
REM/GDP 6.204 9.540 0.071 49.290 
DC/GDP 40.099 23.466 4.178 107.377 
INV/GDP 26.604 6.746 12.612 57.991 
GOVBALN/GDP -1.999 4.155 -12.001 25.462 
GOVERNANCE 0.045 0.682 -1.170 1.067 
TRADE 111.147 28.720 90.129 250.013 
POPULATION 0.071 0.723 -2.258 2.641 
REFORM 3.453 0.470 1.833 4.055 
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As the table shows, there are large variations in per capita GDP growth 
rates over the period under consideration. The minimum value is about -
15%  and the maximum value is 28% and the mean value about 4.7%. 
Domestic credit to GDP ratios (minimum value 4.17%, maximum 
value107.38%) and other macro variables are also highly variable. 
Methodology 
In order to investigate the effect of remittances on growth for 
transition countries, following Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005), and 
Singh et al (2010) we used panel version convergence model where 
growth of GDP per capita is the dependent variable.  
Hence, we estimate the following equation:  
 
ittiititititit uXFINDEVREMyy +++++++=∆ − λαβββββ 232110 lnln       (1) 
 
In this model  1ln −ity  denotes lagged per capita GDP, REM is 
remittances over GDP, FINDEV is financial development and itX
includes other control variables, iα  is country specific fixed effects, tλ
,is time period effect and  is the error term. 
Here lagged per capita GDP is the convergence term. By following 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) and Singh et al. (2010) we used 
domestic credit to GDP as an indicator of financial development. Other 
control variables are investment to GDP, governance, government 
balance merchandise trade and population growth and reform. In 
determining the choice variables, we considered the previous theoretical 
and applied studies in the literature and availability of the data.  
Equation 1 could be estimated with different techniques. The 
simplest model is fixed effects (FE) where we use ordinary least squares 
(OLS) for estimation. However, remittances might also effect the growth 
rate. Due to this endogeneity problem,  the OLS estimates could be 
biased and inconsistent. Therefore, we also used fixed effect instrumental 
variable (FE IV) method. With this method we also deal with possible 
endogeneity of lagged GDP per capita and indicator of financial 
development. There are other estimation methods based on generalized 
method of moments (GMM) like GMM in differences and GMM system 
estimators. However number of countries is  small relative to number of 
instruments to use these estimation methods. Roodman (2006) shows that 
this produces biased results. In order to address the validity of 
instruments we also employ Sargan’s test for overidentifying restrictions. 
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Estimation Results 
Table 4 shows FE and FE IV   estimation results related to the 
effects of remittance on growth for the transition countries. The results 
related to the model including all control variables are presented in the 
Table in column 1 and 2.  The results regarding to the model where we 
exclude some of the control variables that are found to be insignificant in 
the general model are shown in column 3 and 4 in the Table. We used 
country specific and time period fixed effects in all models. Pooled 
regression is a restricted form of fixed effects model8. In order to test the 
validity of this restriction F test has been performed. The F statistic was 
found as 7.39 and significant at 1% level. Hence, we found empirical 
support related to the validity of fixed effects model9. 
Table 4: Estimation Results Regarding Remittance and Growth 
 Dependent Variable:  
 FE (1) FE IV(2) FE(3) 
 
FE IV(4) 
 
lnyit-1 -0.136*** 
(-5.21) 
-0.235*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.133*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.231*** 
(-4.91) 
REM/GDP -0.001* 
(-1.69) 
-0.006* 
(-1.84) 
-0.001* 
(-1.91) 
-0.005* 
(-1.81) 
DC/GDP 
 
INV/GDP 
-0.001*** 
(-4.23) 
0.0009* 
(1.79) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.82) 
0.001* 
(1.68) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.26) 
0.001** 
(2.10) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.73) 
0.002** 
(2.14) 
GOVBALN/GDP 0.002** 
(2.18) 
-0.00002 
(-0.02) 
0.002** 
(2.23) 
-0.00002 
(-0.02) 
GOVERNANCE 0.037** 
(2.40) 
0.057** 
(2.23) 
0.037** 
(2.44) 
0.054** 
(2.15) 
TRADE 0.00002 
(0.170) 
-0.0003 
(0.90) 
  
 
8 In pooled regression all the iα  and tλ coefficients are zero in Equation 1. 
9 The test statistic is 
knRSS
mRSSRSSF
ur
urr
knm −
−
=− /
/)(
,
 , where  RSSr and RSSur stand for restricted 
and unrestricted residual sum of squares. m , n, and k denotes number of restrictions,  number of 
observations and  number of estimated parameters respectively. 
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POPULATION -0.0006 
(-0.09) 
0.018 
(1.39) 
  
REFORM 0.029 
(0.80) 
0.060 
(1.06) 
  
R2 0.730  0.729  
Observations 
Number of Count. 
Sargan Test(p-value) 
242 
22 
242 
22 
0.811 
242 
22 
 
242 
22 
0.99 
Notes: t statistics are in parenthesis. 
* , ** and ***  denotes 10%,  5% and 1% significance level.  
Model (2) and (4) instrumented:lagged per capita GDP, REM/GDP, 
DC/GDP 
Instruments:first lag of INV/GDP, second lag of per capita GDP, 
REM/GDP and third lag of DC/GDP 
 
The results of the fixed effects model are presented in column 1 
of Table 4. As can be seen from the table,  the convergence coefficient of 
lnyit-1 is found to be negative and significant implying the existence of 
conditional convergence. Remittances have a negative and a significant 
effect.  This result is in line with the findings of Chami et al. (2005), and 
Singh et.al  (2010) who also found  a negative relationship  between 
remittances and economic growth.  Another interesting result is that 
domestic credit also has a negative and significant effect on growth. On 
the other hand, investment has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on growth. Moreover, the coefficients of governance and 
government balance are positive and significant as expected. However, 
the coefficients of trade, population and reform are  insignificant. 
As with the fixed effects model,  we obtain similar signs of the 
coefficients with FE-IV model (column 2). Convergence coefficient is -
0.235  and significant. The coefficient of remittance is negative and 
significant. Domestic credit and governance again have a positive impact 
on GDP per capita growth. The only difference is we observe higher 
coefficient values with FE-IV model, which implies higher marginal 
impacts of variables on growth. For example  a 1 percent increase in 
remittance to GDP ratio would reduce the GDP per capita growth by 0.6 
percent while it was 0.1 percent with FE model. Similarly a 1 percent 
increase in domestic credit to GDP ratio would reduce the GDP per 
capita growth 0.1 percent while it was 0.6 with FE model.   The only 
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exception is Government balance to GDP which is found to be negative 
and insignificant. We obtained similar results with more simple models 
(column 3 and column 4). 
In order to investigate the significance of the financial 
development and remittances further, the interaction term of the financial 
development and remittances are used. The coefficient is found to be 
insignificant and not presented here. We also applied dummy variable to 
four transition countries that share of remittance to GDP more than 5% 
for 201210. The coefficients for dummy variable are found to be 
insignificant and not presented here. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we investigated the relationship between 
remittances and economic growth in a sample of 22 transition countries. 
The main findings of the study show that there is a negative relationship 
between remittances and economic growth. In other words,  the adverse 
effects of remittances on growth may dominate in the transition 
countries.  
The inconclusive relationship between remittances and growth 
should lead the policymakers in the transition economies to reconsider 
their optimistic views of remittances and move toward a more realistic 
understanding of their effects. The reason why remittances have not 
spurred economic growth can be partly explained by the fact that they are 
generally not intended to serve as investments but rather as social 
insurance to help family members finance to buy the basic necessities. 
 
References 
Adams, R., and Page, J. (2005). “Do international migration and 
remittances reduce poverty in developing countries?” World 
Development 33( 10), 1645–69. 
Annen, K., Batu, M., Kosempel, S. (2016). “Macroeconomic effects of 
foreign aid and remittances: implications for aid effectiveness 
studies”,Journal of  Policy Modelling, 38 (6), 1136–1146 
Atamanov,A., L., M., Mahmoud, T., Mogilevsky, R., Tereshchenko, K., 
Tourdyeva, N., Uzagalieva, A. and Vavryshchuk, V. (2009). “Income 
and Distribution Effects of Migration and Remittances: An Analysis 
 
10 These countries are Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Geogria. 
 
Karimşakov et. al. / Remittances and Economic Growth in Transition Countries 
www.ijceas.com 
280 
 
Based on CGE Models for Selected CIS Countries”, CASE Network 
Reports, No 86/2009 
Barajas, A., Chami, R., Fullenkamp,C., Gapen, M., and Montiel, M. 
(2009). “Do Workers’ Remittances Promote Economic Growth?”, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/09/153 
Batu, M. (2017). “International workerremittances and economic growth 
in a Real Business Cycle framework”, Structural Change and Economic 
Dynamics, 40, 81–91. 
Bjuggren, P.-O., Dzansi, J., and Shukur,  G. (2010). “Remittances and 
investment” Working Paper Series no. 216, CESIS. 
Blouchoutzi, A., and Nikas, C. (2010). “The macroeconomic 
implications of emigrants' remittances in Romania, Bulgaria and 
Albania”, Post-Communist Economies”, 22(4), 547-558. 
Catrinescu, N., Leon-Ledesma, M., Piracha, M., & Quillin, B. (2009). 
“Remittances, Institutions, and Economic Growth”. World Development, 
37(1), 81-92. 
Castaldo, A.  and Reilly,  B. (2007).  “Do Migrant Remittances Affect 
The Consumption Patterns of Albanian Households?” , South-Eastern 
Europe Journal of Economics, 1, ,25-54 
Chami, .R., Connel Fullenkamp, and Samir Jahjah ( 2005). “Are 
immigrant remittance flows a source of capital for 
development?”,International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Papers, 52 (1), 
55-81. 
Clemens, M. A., and McKenzie, D. J. (2018).” Why don't remittances 
appear to affect growth?”The Economic Journal , 128 (612), F179-F209. 
Feeny, S., Iamsiraroj, S., and McGillivray, M. (2014). “Remittances and 
economic growth: larger impacts in smaller countries?”, The Journal of 
Development Studies, 50(8), 1055-1066. 
Giuliano, P., and M. Ruiz-Arranz.(2009). “Remittances, financial 
development and growth”, Journal of Development Economics, 90, 144–
152. 
Iradian G. Rapip Groweth in Transition Economies:Growth Accounting 
Approach International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper,164. 
Kazcmarzcyk, P., and Okolski, M.,(2008). “Economic Impacts of 
Migration on Poland and the Baltic States, Fafo Paper (1) 
 Kumar, R.R., Stauvermann, P. J. Patel, A.  and Prasad, S. (2018).  “The 
effect of remittances on economicgrowth in Kyrgyzstan and 
 International Journal of Contemporary Economics and  
Administrative Sciences 
ISSN: 1925 – 4423  
Volume: 9, Issue: 2, Year: 2019, pp. 268-281 
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo. 
281 
 
Macedonia:accounting for financial development”, International 
Migration, 56(1),95-126. 
Lartey, Emmanuel K.K., Federico S. Mandelman, and Pablo A. Acosta  
(2008). “Remittances, exchange rate regimes, and the Dutch disease: A 
panel data analysis”, Working Paper 2008-12, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta. 
Le, T. (2009). “Trade, remittances, institutions, and economic growth”, 
International Economic Journal, 23(3), 391-408. 
Meyer, D. and Shera, A. (2017). “The impact of remittances on economic 
growth: An econometric model”, EconomiA, 18(2), 147-155.  
Michael,  B. (2017). “International worker remittances and economic 
growth in a Real Business Cycle framework, Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics 40,81–91 
Mondal, R.K. and Rasheda, K. (2018). “The impacts of international 
migrants’ remittances on household consumption volatility in developing 
countries”, Economic Analysis and Policy, 59, 171-187.  
Nyamongo, E. M., Misati, R. N., Kipyegon, L., and Ndirangu, L. (2012). 
“Remittances, financial development and economic growth in Africa”, 
Journal of Economics and Business, 64(3), 240-260. 
Ratha, D., Plaza, S., Wyss, H., De, S., Schuettler, K., and Yi, S. (2016) 
“Trends in Remittances,: A New Normal of Slow Growth”. (10/06/2016) 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/trends-remittances-2016-new-
normal-slow-growth (Accessed 11/15/2016). 
Roodman, D. (2006).” How to do xtabond2: An introduction to 
difference and system GMM in Stata”. Center for Global Development 
Working Paper No. 103. Washington, DC: Centre for Global 
Development. 
Senbeta, A. (2013). “Remittances and the sources of growth”, Applied 
Economics Letters, 20(6), 572-580. 
Singh J. R., Haacker M., Lee  K., and Le Goff  M.  (2010). 
“Determinants and Macroeconomic Impact of Remittances in Sub-
Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Economies,  20(2), 1–29 
UNICEF (2011). Impact of labour migration on “children left behind” in 
Tajikistan. UNICEF Publication: Dushanbe, Tajikistan. 
World Bank (2013). Migration and Remittance Flows in Europe and 
Central Asia: Recent Trends and Outlook, 2013-2016,  
